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Abstract: This paper traces CNEGC‟s technological development of “introduction-
imitation-innovation” in the past thirty years, which is the top state-owned equipment 
manufacturer in China, shows how its manufacturing capability and innovation capability 
improved, and examines the institutional and environmental factors which can explain these 
changes. Our study indicates that integrating efficient technological learning and 
sustainable right R&D is a vital path for China‟s State-owned equipment manufacturers as 
“latecomers”. Perfect corporate governance, improving finance system, and the globalised 
vision and aspiration of CEO‟s play a crucial role in it. 
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In the past 30 years, equipment manufacturing industry in China improved its 
manufacturing capability greatly through different ways of technology acquisition. But the 
asymmetry between strong manufacturing capability and weak technological capability 
constraints its international competence (Liu 2002). Equipment manufacturing industry is 
one of the strategic basic industries embodying a nation‟s competence, which mainly 
provides large-size equipments for metallurgical, power, chemical, and other major 
industries. Chinese equipment manufacturers‟ general technological capability lags 15-20 
years behind the multinational leaders. As latecomers, Chinese manufacturers can buy the 
equipments, even some manufacturing technologies. But acquiring dynamic imitation 
capability and innovation capability is a continuously accumulative process instead of a 
one-off deal. Moreover, no matter how debatable the pattern of „introduction-imitation-
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innovation‟ has been, it is crucial for Chinese equipment enterprises to get out of the 
vicious cycle of dependent introduction and static technological capability, and achieve 
dynamic technological capabilities and latecomer‟s advantage. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are still dominant players in China‟s equipment manufacturing industry. So, this 
paper chooses a state-owned equipment manufacturer for case study. 
In order to narrow the technological gap with developed countries, from 1979 Chinese 
government has been seeking an efficient corporate governance system, e.g. contract 
responsibility system, corporate system and joint-stock systems, to motivate SOEs to 
improve their technological capability and competitive advantages in both domestic and 
international markets (Nolan 2001; Tylecote and Cai 2004）. But until 2001, compared 
with privately-owned firms (POEs), SOEs‟ performance has been volatile and generally 
poor. Moreover, as POEs became stronger competitors, SOEs‟ sales and profit suffered 
accordingly (Nolan and Zhang 2002; Cai and Tylecote 2005). But after China‟s entry into 
WTO in 2001, the corporate governance of SOEs has been changing greatly, i.e. structure 
of ownership, selection of management, assessment criteria, forms of penalties, etc. At the 
same time, SOEs‟ technological capability and general performance have been improving. 
From 2002-2007 SOEs‟ sales and profit increased 16.1% and 33.7% on average per year, 
meanwhile the absolute number of firms decreased by around 10,000 annually. How can we 
explain such phenomenon? Is it a result of monopolization or development of technological 
capabilities or improvement of corporate governance? 
This paper traces the technological development history of one large-scale SOE, China 
National Erzhong Group Co. (hereto CNEGC). Specifically, we discuss how the state-
owned equipment manufacturer‟s technological capabilities evolve over time, and explain 
its distinctive performance change from the corporate governance perspective. Data 
collection was conducted in May-September 2007, through intensive face-to-face 
interviews with CNEGC‟s top management, technology centre, manufacturing branches, 
marketing department and subsidiaries. We also drew on CNEGC‟s yearbooks (1958-2006) 
for complementary insights and statistical data.  
The main research questions are:  
 How can we depict the different stages of technological capabilities in CNEGC？ 
 How was CNECGC able to improve its technological capabilities and acquire 
sustainable competitive advantage, given its position as a latecomer operating in an 
increasingly open and competitive environment?  
 What role have institutional factors, more particularly corporate governance (in the 
broadest sense), played in the evolution of CNEGC‟s technological capabilities? 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and proposes 
our theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the technological capabilities developed in 
CNEGC at different stages along the path of technology introduction, imitation and 
innovation. The firm‟s general performance was also tracked longitudinally. Additionally, it 
demonstrates the efficient path to developing innovation capability through two examples. 
Section 4 analyzes the effects of corporate governance and finance on technological 
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2. Literature review and analytical framework 
 
In the era of globalization and increasing uncertainty, the fundamental question in strategic 
management is how firms can obtain unique competence and acquire sustainable 
competitive advantages (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994). Porter (1985) and Barney 
(2002) divided the competitive status of enterprises into three types: competitive 
advantages, competitive parity and competitive disadvantages. The enterprise with the 
competitive advantages generally outperforms those with only competitive parity. Here 
performance is defined through comparison between value produced by the productive 
assets and the value expected by the owners（Coase 1937; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976）. In this paper, sales and profit are used to indicate firm 
performance. 
Technological capability refers to the ability to make effective use of technological 
knowledge. It is the major determinant of industrial competitiveness (OECD 1996; Schacht 
1997; Kim 1999). “Latecomer‟s advantage” theory indicates that the latecomers in 
developing countries usually develop their technological capabilities first through 
introducing technologies, and then building innovation capabilities based on technological 
learning and imitation（Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson 1987; Dosi 1988; Lall 1992; Wu 
and Xu 1995; Kim 1999; Amsden and Chu 2003). At the introduction stage, the 
technologies that latecomers face are given; their main tasks are hence utilization. So, at 
such moment latecomers‟ technological capabilities are mainly static, which are based on 
existing technology or technology-using skills（Ariffin and Figueiredo 2001）. At the later 
stage of imitation, latecomers can legally duplicate and/or illegally counterfeit, and improve 
existing technologies - they have duplicative imitation capabilities (Bell and Pavitt 1993; 
Kim 1997). If firms have the ability to identify scope for efficient technology utilization, to 
extend and deepen their own capabilities or draw selectively on others to complete their 
own capabilities, they will undergo the process of innovation capability building in which 
firms start to generate emerging technology that cannot be acquired (competitively) from 
either local or foreign sources. At the later two stages, the firms‟ technological capabilities 
are dynamic - the abilities to create new technology or change and improve existing 
technology. Moreover, in a given technological paradigm (Dosi 1982) latecomers have at 
least two opportunities in the field of mature technologies, i.e. improving mature 
technologies and “re-inventing” mature technologies (Perez and Soete, 1988; Utterback, 
1994; Gao, 2003).  
Drawing upon Fransman (1984), Katz (1987), Dahlman and Westphal (1987), Lall (1987, 
1992), Yam et al (2004), this paper evaluates technological capabilities in five dimensions: 
Investment Capability, Product Capability, Production Capability, Organization Capability 
and Strategic Capability. Investment Capability includes skills needed to identify, evaluate 
and acquire technology for new products/facilities or for upgrading the existing 
technological base. It determines the capital costs and the appropriateness of the technology 
selected. Product Capability contains skills required to produce products or improve 
product specifications, such as parts assembly and improvement in product design for cost-
effectiveness and product diversification. Production Capability decides the productivity of 
product making. It assesses firms‟ ability of process management, quality management and 
efficiency management. Organization capability evaluates firms‟ ability to make changes in 
organizational structure, ownership and reduction in hierarchy, bureaucratic attitudes to 
Paper presented in the VI Globelics Conference at Mexico City, September 22-24 2008 
 
 
cope with technological change. Strategic Capability refers to the ability to identify internal 
strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats, formulate plans according 
to corporate vision and missions, and adjust the plans for implementation. 
There is increasing interest in the effects of corporate governance on technological 
development in developing countries, particularly the governance of SOEs. The effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance has been recognized as early as Berle and 
Means (1932). It later became a long-standing research area covering various disciplines 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986, 1993; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). However, 
earlier research mainly focused on the direct correlation between corporate governance and 
performance. Few referred to the effects of corporate governance on technological 
development and then on performance. Lazonick and O‟Sullivan (1996, 2002), Lazonick 
(2005) and O‟Sullivan (2000) put forward a general institutional framework to analyze the 
technological development of innovative firms which considered corporate governance and 
finance (CG&F).  
Tylecote and Conesa (1999), Tylecote and Ramirez (2006) and Tylecote (2007) developed a 
more specific theoretical framework on the effects of CG&F on firms‟ technological 
development. Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions affecting the way in which a corporation is directed, administered or controlled 
(OECD, 2004). The central problem in CG&F is information asymmetry – in finance, 
between receivers and providers, and in corporate governance between agent and principal: 
management and owners, if these are „outside‟ shareholders or the state (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The managers of SOEs are responsible to officials who are themselves 
not principals, but agents of more senior officials. Such second-order agency must increase 
the resulting distortions of behaviour. These will particularly affect activities directed at 
technological development, because many of their immediate outputs have low visibility 
from the point of view of principals (and financiers). Their costs however are highly 
visible. If the principal (or financier) is „dis-engaged‟ from the firm, therefore ill-informed 
about it, the manager will feel under pressure to spend sub-optimally on such activities – 
and perhaps more on relatively high-visibility activities. Such pressures will be the greater, 
the shorter the manager‟s time horizon in the job (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). Two other 
aspects of corporate governance are relevant: (i) How much expertise do owners have 
regarding the technologies and markets relevant to the firm? Industrial expertise, combined 
with engagement, gives good understanding of the value of technological activities. (ii) 
How are stakeholder spill-overs from technological change managed? Spill-overs are costs 
and benefits to stakeholders, mainly employees, and related firms. Stakeholder inclusion 
involves cooperative efforts to make improvements.  
The research of Tylecote and Cai (2004), Cai and Tylecote（2005）, Nolan and 
Zhang（2002）showed that these insights are relevant, with some adaptation to the 
Chinese context. The problem of agents (managers) answering to agents (government 
officials) and the continuously shifting supervisory roles among different government 
authorities, discouraged shareholder engagement to technological development. The 
traditional SOE top manager‟s career path is essentially that of an official, chosen for his 
position by other officials and looking to be moved before long (perhaps five years) into a 
higher position, in a larger firm or a ministry. The time horizon in the job is therefore short, 
and while in it, the need is to make a good impression on senior officials – themselves 
subject to regular rotation and unlikely to „engage‟ closely with the firm. Worse still, some 
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of these managers have been „parachuted‟ into the organization, mostly with limited 
industrial expertise, nor do they have the incentive to learn, due to their short time-horizon. 
Moreover, if SOE mangers perform badly, the traditional way to handle this is to reallocate 
them to a similar position in another firm (under the supervision of the same ministry) – 
managers do not have to bear the result of their mistakes, hence the pressure for shareholder 
value maximization (particularly in the long run) is missing. 
Although agreeing with their conclusions, we propose that there are two more key 
characteristics in the governance (and finance) of Chinese SOEs that have been influential 
to their capability development. First of all, the over-reliance on the single criterion of 
short-term profit in performance measurement has limited the incentive for firms to develop 
sustainable technological (innovation) capabilities. As for finance, Cai and Tylecote (2005) 
argue that although SOEs are generally ill-governed, they are meanwhile well-financed. Yet 
the financial situations of SOEs have undergone significant changes since the mid 1990s. 
The traditional financiers of Chinese SOEs have been state-owned banks who are prevented 
by law from engaging with funded firms. Until 1995, their roles as channels of government 
subsidies meant they had to fund any authority-appointed firms (mostly SOEs) regardless 
of their performance (Ding, 1999). SOEs at that time were blessed with funds and 
exempted from obligations to fulfill strategic investment. However, we found that 
following the introduction of „Commercial Bank Law‟ and general transformation of state 
commercial banks, SOEs suddenly woke up to find themselves no longer financially 
privileged. We argue that at this stage the lack of funding has also hindered their 
development of technological capability. 
Based on the above analytical framework and observations, we go on to study the 
longitudinal evolution of CG&F in a typical Chinese SOE - CNEGC, and their effects on 
the development of technological capability. Particularly, we strive to understand the new 
patterns and progress of capability development in the firm since China‟s entry into WTO 
in 2001, by looking at changes in its CG&F. 
 
3. Development of technological capabilities in CNEGC 
 
3.1 Basic information of CNEGC 
CNEGC was established in 1993. Its predecessor State-owned No.2 Heavy Machine 
Factory was founded in 1958 in a heavy-industry hub in Western China. CNEGC is now a 
state-owned „backbone‟ enterprise making key technical equipments for Chinese national 
economy and national defense construction. It is one of China‟s 21 domestic „heavy 
machinery bases‟ – key manufacturers. By the end of 2006, it had over 12,900 employees 
and more than 1,200 R&D personnel. Its main products include large-size complete-set 
metallurgical equipments, large-size castings and forgings, etc. The market shares of its 
main products are among 45% to 60% in China. It also sells to developed countries 
including USA, Germany, UK and Japan, etc. 
 
3.2 Developing stages of technological capabilities and performance of CNEGC 
According to the literature review in Section 2 and the process of technological capability 
building, since 1979 CNEGC‟s technological development has undergone three stages, 
namely Technology introduction & Dependent Manufacturing (1979-1989: stage 1), 
Duplicative Imitation & Collaborative Manufacturing (1990-2000: stage 2), and Indigenous 
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Innovation & Integrated Manufacturing  (2001-present: stage 3). 
 
3.2.1 Technology Introduction & Dependent Manufacturing (1979-1989) 
This stage parallels the early period of China‟s reform and opening up. Due to sharp 
reduction of government plan after 1979, CNEGC for the first time had to face the market‟s 
demand and competition. Therefore it adjusted the product and service structure 
accordingly, e.g. expanding product mix from large-size complete-set equipments to small 
complete-set equipments and industrial and mining fittings, and expanding its target market 
segments. In order to improve its product lines and production capability, CNEGC took 
advantage of the opening up opportunities given to privileged large SOEs, and introduced 
up-to-date manufacturing technologies and equipments from foreign firms. 
Table 1 Technological capabilities of CNEGC at Stage 1 (1979-1989) 
 Important events 
Strategic 
Capability 
Authorized by State Council to open to the outside world as the earliest group of SOEs in 1979 
Introducing foreign up-to-date manufacturing technologies and machinery to develop product and 
production capability 
Adjusting the structure of product and service to adapt to market system, expanding from large-size 
machinery to small-size complete-set machinery and accessories 
Investment 
Capability 
Introducing foreign manufacturing technologies and machinery through licensing trade in large bulks 
Product 
Capability 
Imitating mature products, e.g. 10,000t polydirectional hydraulic press, 2450mm 4-roller reversible hot 
mill, 3300mm plate mill, etc. 
Manufacturing of products designed by foreign firms or other domestic firms, e.g. 2,050mm hot tandem 
mill(cooperated design with SMS, Germany), 1,550mm plate blank tandem mill(cooperated design with 
Kobe Steel, Ltd., Japan), etc. 
Production 
Capability 
Assimilating acquired technologies and renewing equipments to improve production capabilities 
Organization 
capability 
Establishment of Standards Committee, Heavy Machinery Design & Research Institute and Large-size 
Casting and Forging Research Institute 
Sending technicians abroad for training and collaborative design 
At Stage 1, the typical technology introduction was through technological licensing : (i) 
1978-1988, manufacturing technologies of hot die forging press, horizontal forging press 
and equipments from Eumuco Co. (ii) 1982-1986, manufacturing technologies of large-size 
casting and forging products from Japan. (iii) 1984-1991, 400mm artificial crystal 
autoclave equipments from USA. 
Corresponding to with technology introduction, the main patterns of manufacturing and 
products were: (i) imitation of mature products. (ii) CNEGC responsible for production 
while foreign partners in charge of design or general technology.  
CNEGC realized the need to ensure product quality and improve its process technology. So 
it took the following measures: (i) implementing the standards used by foreign industrial 
leaders and attempting to establish its own product-oriented standard system. (ii) Setting up 
standard organizations including the Standards Committee and Standards Office which was 
in charge of daily operation. (iii) Founding the Total Quality Management (TQM) Office. 
(iv) Establishing Process Technology Office which was lead by the chief engineer and in 
charge of cold and hot process technology. (v) Establishing Heavy Machinery R&D 
Institute and Large-size Casting and Forging Research Institute, intending to re-design 
some mature products to match local market needs. (vi) Sending technical staff to train and 
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jointly design abroad, from 1979 to 1988 448 were sent. 
CNEGC spent 5-10 years to assimilate the above introduced manufacturing technologies 
and equipments. As a result: (i) it possessed the necessary ability to cooperate with the 
foreign firms on design and production at Stage 2. (ii) Its process technology was 
continuously improved. For example, the large-size complete-set castings and forgings 
produced by CNEGC for introduced 600MW thermal power unit reached top international 
standards, symbolising its achievement in hot process technology. (iii) Its sales growth and 




3.2.2 Duplicative Imitation & Collaborative Manufacturing (1990-2000) 
Since 1990, competition from POEs increased quickly in the smaller machinery sub-sectors 
(relatively easy to enter) and the heavy equipment manufacturing industry shrunk due to 
government macro-control. In order to maintain its sales and profit, CNEGC adjusted its 
business policies, i.e. „to focus equal on large complete sets as well as small/medium-size 
equipments; on long-term strategic and short-term tactic products, on popular and 
unpopular products‟. As Table 2 shows, its technology strategy also shifted from 
„Technology introduction & Dependent Manufacturing‟ to „Duplicative Imitation & 
Collaborative Manufacturing‟. On the one hand, it jointly designed and manufactured 
mature products with foreign firms to develop product and production capabilities; on the 
other hand, it re-designed mature products for local market demand. 
Table 2 Technological capabilities of CNEGC at Stage 2 (1990-2000) 
 Important events 
Strategic 
Capability 
Joint design and collaborative manufacturing with foreign firms to develop product and production 
capability 
Re-design mature products for local market demand 
Investment 
Capability 
Decrease in R&D investment 
R&D endeavor mainly in improvement of large-size steam turbine cylinder and aviation die forging 
Stagnant upgrade and improvement of manufacturing equipments 
Product 
Capability 
Producing mature products with foreign firms, while foreign firms frequently in charge of general 
technological design, e.g. 155t RH/AHF molten steel refining equipment, 1450 hot rolling strip steel 
complete-set tandem mill, hot rolling strip steel complete-set equipment, 2250 hot tandem mill 
Re-designing and producing mature products to match local market demand by CNEGC, e.g. 3500mm 
tandem mill, KP8000 hot die forging mill, etc. 
Production 
Capability 
Obtaining necessary certificates for operation, e.g. ISO9000, ASME, U and U2 for pressure vessel, ZC, LR, 
ABS, GL, DNV, NK, BV, RINA for large-size marine casting and forging 
Adopting important and advanced foreign standards, e.g. SN200, EN, DIN, JIS 
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Fig. 1 Sales of CNEGC, 1979-1989（million RMB） Fig. 2 Profit of CNEGC, 1979-1989（million RMB） 





Establishing Technological Centre to manage technological innovation in 1999 
Restructuring Quality Department in 2000 
Cooperating with Tsinghua University, Yanshan University, etc. in product and process improvement 
Table 3 shows, from 1991 to 1997, CNEGC‟s equipment modification and renewal slowed 
down, and its R&D focused on imitation of the technologies for making large-size castings 
and forgings. 
As for product design and manufacturing, CNEGC resorted to joint design and 
collaborative manufacturing with foreign firms based its relatively strong manufacturing 
capabilities. Different from stage 1, at stage 2 the foreign firms usually took charge of 
general technology, and CNEGC no longer only specialized in manufacturing but also 
undertook detailed design and major manufacturing tasks. It means that CNEGC had 
developed irreplaceable production capability and had gradually improved its process 
technology. Besides, CNEGC re-designed some mature product for local market needs. 
Among these, in 1998 CNEGC independently designed, produced and installed a 
longitudinal shearing unit for Baoji Petroleum Steel Plant , such bundled project involved 
integrated production of mechanical, electric and hydraulic equipments, and can be 
regarded as a milestone for its technological breakthrough. 
Table 3 Equipment modification and renewal of CNEGC, 1991-1997 
year 
Item 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1994 1996 1997 
Number of modification 34 6 14 6 4 6 7 
Among 
which 
overall modification 8 2 5 3 2 2 1 
Electric modification 11 3 8 2 1 4 4 
       Number of renewal 38 25 23 8 5 2 2 
 
In order to meet the strict requirements of the cooperators in quality and process, CNEGC 
took the following measurements: (i) Continuously improving process technology and 
design capability. It formulated a series of process management protocols to ensure 
scientific, programmed, and standardized process management. (ii) Actively adopting up-
to-date foreign standards, such as Germany SN200 \ EN \ DIN, Japan's JIS and its 
cooperators‟ own standards. (iii) Strengthening the role of Quality Department for quality 
inspection and management. It successfully passed ISO9001 Quality System Certification 
and a number of other international quality certifications. Especially, its large-size marine 
castings and forgings got certified in eight countries, including UK, US, Germany and 
Japan. (iv) Developing Industry-University link through cooperation with top Chinese 
universities (for example, Tsinghua University) and research institutes. (v) Setting up 
Technology Center to take charge of technological innovation management in 1999. 
However, due to lack of control over the key technology, CNEGC did not manage to profit 
from its endeavour. As Mr Zeng, vice general manager, said in the interview, at Stage 2 
CNEGC did 80% of the job but only received 20% of the profit. As Fig. 3 and 4 shows, 
although its sales maintained above a certain level, its profit fluctuated frequently and 
sometimes was negative.  





3.2.3 Indigenous Innovation & Integrated Manufacturing (2001- ) 
After China‟s entry into WTO in 2001, as China increased investment to the metallurgy 
industry and implemented active and steady monetary policy, the heavy equipment industry 
obtained a good development opportunity. It was most important for CNEGC to take 
advantage of this opportunity to improve its performance and acquire sustainable 
competitive advantage. In order to do that, its top management set out its technology 
strategy from „Duplicative Imitation & Collaborative Manufacturing‟ to „Indigenous 
Innovation & Integrated Manufacturing‟ through developing new products according to the 
changes in industrial policies and international and domestic markets.  
Table 4 Technological capabilities of CNEGC at Stage 2 (1990-2000) 
 Important events 
Strategic 
Capability 
Indigenous innovation & Integrated manufacturing 
Investment 
Capability 
Exploiting new products 
Selectively introducing foreign up-to-date technologies 
Prospectively developing new technologies concerning exploitation of marine resources 
Product 
Capability 
Exploiting and commercializing a series of new products protected by patent 
Indigenous design and manufacturing of up-to-date mature products, e.g. complete-set 5m-thick plate 
rolling mill, 3,500mm-thick plate rolling mill, 1,450mm hot coil box equipment of hot tandem mill, 
1,750mm hot tandem mil, complete-set 2250 hot tandem mill exporting to Poland, etc. 
Forming product line to take charge of general technology in large-size complete-set equipments  
Production 
Capability 
Established standards of machinery production techniques and revised technological standards 
Increasing funds in nc machines 
Implementing four important technological transformation programs funded by plenty of finance 
Starting the indigenous design and manufacturing of 80000-ton large-size die and forging pressing machine 
in Dec. 2007, which is the biggest in the world. 
Organization 
capability 
Adjusting the organizational and functional structure of Technological Centre, integrated the five research 
institutes into Technological Centre as its subordinate bodies 
Propellent in the national and industrial standards of heavy machinery 
Establishing China‟s first patent incubator base and commercializing patented products 
As shown in Table 4, of CNEGC quickly adjusted its investment priority from diversified 
development in stage 2: (i) Focusing on new product exploitation. (ii) Accelerating 
equipment renewal and modification to support the exploitation of new products. (iii) 
Integrating internal and external recourses to form product line, endeavoring to replace 
foreign firms to be in charge of general technology in large-size complete-set projects. (iv) 
Selectively introducing foreign up-to-date technologies, e.g. cold rolling technology, 
manufacturing technology of HP-IP rotor for supercritical unit, nuclear power technology, 
and wind power technology. (v) According to global technological development trends, 




















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fig. 3 Sales of CNEGC, 1991-2000（million 
RMB） 
Fig. 4 Profit of CNEGC, 1991-2000（million 
RMB） 
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Fig. 5 and 6 show, at this stage, R&D investment in CNEGC has continuously increased, 
and the number of patent applications rose in general and the number of invention 
application also increased markedly. Especially, the number of invention applications was 




Benefiting from efficient R&D, CNEGC indigenously developed and patented a series of 
new products, which is a good indicator of innovation capabilities. Notably, the success of 
low-carbon upper rim castings for Three Gorges turbine and 600 MW supercritical steam 
turbine cylinders made CNEGC leader of large-size castings and forgings in China. Its 12% 
Cr-type HP-IP rotor for ultra-supercritical power unit also ranked top in the world in 
material and process technology. In December, 2007, CNEGC started an 80,000t Large-size 
Die Forging Press project, which is designed and produced indigenously. In three years it 
will be finished as the largest press in the world.  
At stage 3, CNEGC began to take charge of general technology and integrated 
manufacturing. The typical events were: (i) design and production of 1250mm hot tandem 
mill, showing that CNEGC has become one of the top firms capable of integrating 
mechanical, electrical and hydraulic technologies in large complete-set metallurgical 
equipments. (ii) design and production of 1450mm hot tandem mill,  meaning that CNEGC 
has become one of the few firms capable of indigenous design and manufacturing of wide 
strip mill. (iii) Receiving two orders of hot tandem mill meant that it has become the 
general contractor of hot tandem mill. (iv) The order of 1700mm hot tandem mill showed 
that it began to take charge of integrated mechanical, electrical and hydraulic design and 
manufacturing in cold rolling mill for the first time. It also began to design and produce 
internal and external cylinders and full set of valves of 600MW to 1000MW Ultra-
supercritical units for other firms. Meanwhile, CNEGC has risen from the subsidiary 
position in foreign cooperation and started to play a more equal role in joint design and 
collaborative manufacturing, in which its 5000mm heavy plate mill in collaboration with 
SMS was the first heavy plate mill and was called “King of Mills” in the world. 
As for export of large-size equipments, CNEGC successfully sold its largest (5500 mm) 
vertical mill to Mitsubishi, and its export of large-size complete-set metallurgical 
equipment (a high-technology and high-value-added form of export) to Europe started with 
a 2250mm hot tandem mill to Poland. Its main customers extended to well-known 
multinationals in US, Germany, UK, Japan, and other countries, including firms such as 
Hitachi, which have been providing it with technology and equipments at the first two 
stages. 
In order to ensure R&D efficiency and to develop innovation capabilities, CNEGC took the 

















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
total invention utility model
Fig. 5 R&D of CNEGC, 2001-2007(million RMB) Fig. 6 Patent application of CNEGC, 1999-2007(piece) 
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the organization and function of its Technology Center by integrating the 5 key research 
institutes of process technology, measurement technology, heavy equipment design, and 
information technology, etc.  It also founded specialized institutes to develop capabilities in 
the high-tech heavy pressure vessels and nuclear power product sectors. More importantly, 
it formulated and implemented strategic goals and priorities for medium/long-term 
technological development according to the technological trends and market demand in the 
international heavy machinery industry. (ii) Carrying out a series of important technological 
improvement with heavy investments up to 1.2 billion RMB
4
 each. (iii) Focusing on the 
improvement of advanced cold process technologies. (iv) Zealously taking part in the 
industry-standard formulation and continuously improving enterprise standards. At this 
stage, it was chosen to lead the Provincial Process Technology Management Committee and 
took a chief role in the Chinese Association of Large-size Casting and Forging for Heavy 
Machinery, and chaired the Technology Standards Committee of Large-size Forging and 
Casting in China. At the same time, it constantly improved its own standards, including 
formulating process standards for machinery manufacturing and revising its 11-volume 
technological standard. (v) Emphasizing intellectual property management. It established 
China‟s first patent incubator base. In 2004, its key technology-„coreless coil box‟ was 
granted Chinese Excellent Patent Award. 
With the development of technological capabilities, CNEGC‟s performance maintained a 
sustainable increase, which was never seen before. As Fig. 7 and 8 show, from 2001 to 
2007 its sales increased by 7 times to 5772.6 million RMB and profit by more than 500 
times to 560.38 million RMB – each boasting an average rate of 39.22% and 202.03% 
annually. 
    
 
 
3.3 Developing path of innovation capability in CNEGC 
 
3.3.1 General analysis 
The technological development of CNEGC shows that technology paradigms do exist in 
the equipment manufacturing industry during a given period, and it is possible for 
„latecomers‟ like CNEGC to develop innovation capabilities through integrating efficient 
technological learning and sustainable right R&D. On the one hand, it is efficient learning 
that gives „latecomers‟ the opportunity to accelerate their own technological capabilities 
and catch up with „first movers‟. Therefore even if they have possessed certain innovation 
capabilities, it is still crucial for „latecomers‟ to actively learn and exploit external 
knowledge. On the other hand, technological learning itself does not naturally bring the 
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Fig. 7 Sales of CNEGC, 2001-2007(million RMB) Fig. 8 Profit of CNEGC, 2001-2007(million RMB) 
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„latecomers‟ the ability to create new technology or knowledge. In fact, there is usually a 
time lag when „latecomers‟ learn and imitate the leader‟s technologies - with the 
accelerating speed of current technology and product update and diffusion , there are fewer 
opportunities for „latecomers‟ to acquire „latecomer‟s advantage‟ through technological 
learning. Especially, leading firms in developed countries are now more and more serious 
about preventing technology spillover through foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
technological trade. In the situation of globalization, they are taking strict control over core 
patents and key know-how to sustain „first-mover advantage‟. Therefore it is advisable for 
latecomers to develop innovation capabilities through sustainable right R&D - no matter in 
the forms of improving mature technology or „re-inventing‟ mature technology - according 
to global technological trends and market demand. 
 
3.3.2 The case of large-size steam turbine cylinder: an example of improving mature 
technology 
In May 1982, in order to improve its technological capabilities in hot-process, CNEGC 
introduced large-size casting and forging technology and manufacturing equipments from 
Japan Steel Works Co. With a decade of technological learning and imitation, CNEGC 
acquired the manufacturing technologies of 125MW, 300 MW, 600 MW sub-critical steam 
turbine cylinders. Its quality met the standards of several multinationals including Hitachi, 
and its customers expanded from domestic firms to Siemens, GE, and Hitachi, etc. Till 
2001 CNEGC has sold more than 200 sets of steam turbine cylinders domestically, and it 
has dominated more than half of the Chinese market. The growing cylinder export to 
world-level leaders means that its capabilities in the related areas have been accepted by 
these firms. 
Due to reduction in coal consumption and improvement of power generation efficiency, the 
supercritical and ultra-supercritical steam turbines have gradually become the mainstream 
products of steam turbines. However, the production requires high quality material and 
process technology. Since 2002, three China‟s most famous steam turbine manufacturers 
have acquired the manufacturing capacity of supercritical and ultra-supercritical 600 MW 
and 1000 MW steam turbines through introducing and absorbing the relevant technology 
from overseas. It posed a vital challenge for CNEGC to meet the emerging domestic (and 
foreign) market needs by further improve its hot process capability. 
How can this be done? CNEGC was faced with the alternatives of re-introducing up-to-date 
foreign technologies or increasing R&D to improve the process capabilities based on its 
existing technological capabilities. It chose the latter and took the following measures: (i) 
Its casting plant formulated the technological development plan of large-size casting 
process, and implemented it in 2002. (ii) Increased R&D in the new materials and 
technologies of supercritical and ultra-supercritical steam turbine cylinder, high pressure 
rotor, and welding. (iii) It revised its process procedure regulations and strengthened 
process-oriented quality control. In 2002 the Casting Plant put forward a creative quality 
management concept-„one-attempt success and zero tolerance for substandard pieces‟, and 
developed efficient assessment criteria for each step of the process as part of process-
oriented quality management. (iv) Improved incentive mechanism was introduced in 
innovation projects and success was generously rewarded. (v) It dynamically integrated 
internal resources and initiated organisational changes to match the requirements of 
technological development. In September 2005 CNEGC transformed the Testing Workshop 
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of Large-size Casting and Forging Institute into Special Casting Workshop of Casting Plant. 





Thanks to sustainable R&D and efficient innovation management, CNEGC completed the 
casting model of 600MW supercritical turbine cylinder in 2002, and the casting model of 
large complete-set gas turbine cylinder in 2004, both the first of their kinds in China. In 
2005, CNEGC successfully produced supercritical and ultra-supercritical high pressure 
turbine cylinders and began to supply the aforementioned domestic famous firms. The 
technological development of turbine cylinder in CNEGC shows that it has acquired the 
dynamic indigenous innovation capability and has caught up with the current state of large-
size castings in the world through sustainable right R&D based on technology introduction 
and imitation. Fig. 9 and 10 show the casting output of generator, steam turbine and 
cylinder in CNEGC from 1991-2005. 
 
3.3.3 The case of hot tandem mill: an example of „re-inventing‟ mature technology 
Hot tandem mill is the key equipment in metallurgical production lines, which is the 
leading product of the CNEGC. To acquire the design and manufacturing technology of hot 
tandem mill, from the early 1980‟s it carried out technological learning and imitation 
through „inviting in‟ (introducing foreign technology into the firm) and „going abroad‟ 
(sending technical staff to train overseas), „learning by doing‟ and „learning by using‟. For 
example, in order to complete the 3050mm hot tandem mill with SMS, Co., in 1985-1987 
CNEGC sent over 30 technicians to Germany to participate in over-all project design, 
implementing scheme design and construction design. As a result, CNEGC completed 
design drawings at a higher product level than the contract. Through efficient technological 
learning and imitation, CNEGC accumulated strong manufacturing capabilities in hot 
tandem mill; meanwhile, through absorbing the mature and even cutting-edge technology 
of foreign firms, it reduced much time and financial cost in the development of process 
technology. Most importantly, through a different path („learning by doing and imitation‟ 
instead of „first-mover innovation‟), it managed to reach the leaders‟ previous position at an 
earlier time point and shortened the technology gap.  
For a long time, foreign multinationals have safe-guarded the hot coil box technology 
which is key in continuous rolling strip ASP short-flow production line. It was vitally 
necessary for CNEGC to break the technical blockage and become the one-stop contractor 
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Fig. 9 Casting output of generators and 
turbine of CNEGC, 1991-2005 (MW) 
Fig. 10 Cylinder output of CNEGC, 1991-2005 (set) 
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tandem mill. In order to do so, CNEGC set up a hot coil box project team. With years‟ 
effort, it developed the first generation of hot coil box by itself in 1999. Then it achieved 
timely intellectual property (IP) protection by patenting it in China. At the same time, the 
hot coil box technology has further updated and a more advanced coreless conveying-type 
technology has emerged. Coreless conveying-type technology was the latest in the world 
and was hard to develop. CNEGC set up a coreless conveying-type hot coil box project 
team and in 2001 successfully developed a new product (the current state-of-the-art) using 
this technology through repeated research as well as revision of technical plans (It again 
patented it). The success of coreless conveying-type hot coil box solved the bottleneck 
problem of Chinese metallurgical industry, which in the past required heavy investment due 
to the long production line, large temperature difference between the head and tail of 
„embryonic strip‟, and unstable quality. Meanwhile CNEGC was able to make a price 30-
40% cheaper than imported coil boxes. Due to such technological success and the 
indigenous IP, CNEGC gradually took over foreign firms‟ role as one-stop contractor in this 
field. From 2000 to the end of 2006, its hot rolling strip steel projects with patented hot coil 
box technology created an output value of 2.479 billion RMB. 
 
3.4 Conceptual framework for the development of technological capability in CNEGC 
The conceptual framework for the development of technological capability in CNEGC 
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4. Explanation of technological capability evolution in CNEGC from the corporate 
governance perspective 
 
4.1 Large-scale SOE prioritised to “introduce technology” 
As section 3.2.1 describes, since 1979 CNEGC acquired large quantity of advanced foreign 
technology and equipments through licensing trades. Meanwhile, by assimilating and 
localising the introduced technology and equipments, it managed to make significant 
improvements and upgrades to its technology and products. After nearly one decade of 
technology introduction and assimilation CNEGC had built up strong manufacturing 
capability. Its process technology at the same time was continuously uplifted through 
technology transformation, ensuring the firm a fair sales and profit performance in the 
competitive market environment. 
From the point of CG&F, three elements have contributed to the success of CNEGC‟s 
„technology introduction‟: 
 The ownership type of large-scale SOE. CNEGC was under the supervision of First 
Ministry of Machinery (FMM) at the time of establishment. In January 1979, approved 
by the State Council, FMM started to „open up‟ CNEGC as the first batch for 
international trade. It is the firm‟s large scale and its important role in supporting the 
nation‟s economy that has brought it such privilege.  
 The reduction of governmental intervention in SOEs‟ operation and the adjustment of 
managers‟ assessment criteria and methods. Under the planned economy, the state 
determined every detail in the plan and production of CNEGC, the firm‟s function has 
been reduced to that of a workshop. Following the reduction of state quota, the firm 
was increasingly faced with market competition and the need to profit through meeting 
changing market demand. There is hence an urgent call for governance reform. The 
year 1984 saw the Ministry of Machinery implementing „firm director responsibility 
system‟ (Changzhang Fuzezhi) in CNEGC. It is the first time that top managers are 
empowered to have control over its operations and responsible for its profit and loss – a 
far cry from bureaucratic orders under the planned economy. Matching such change 
was the organisational restructuring. In the same year CNEGC reorganised its 
workshops and supporting units into economic entities (8 branches and 7 subsidiaries), 
the branches were responsible for its main businesses and the subsidiaries for sideline 
businesses. A two-way responsibility and profit distribution system was established 
between headquarter and the branches. According to a regulation issued by the State 
Council in 1986
5
, CNEGC entered into a four-year fixed profit responsibility contract 
with the local city government, in which the firm was committed to progressive profit 
submission. Two years later, another contract was signed between the two about staff 
wage fund (for the first time associated with the actual profit) from the government. 
From then on the firm was run under contracted managerial responsibility system. 
Meanwhile, the form of internal resource allocation changed from distribution 
according to productivity to ditto of profitability. Profit replaced production as the key 
indicator of managers‟ performance. In this stage CNEGC experienced separation of 
                                                        
5 The Regulation about Deepening Enterprise Reform and Enhancing Enterprise Dynamism (1986, 103). 
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ownership and control and the adjustment of assessment criteria, which in combination 
freed the firm from total dependence on state plan. It started to focus on meeting the 
dynamic market demand. Through introduction and assimilation of foreign technology, 
it managed to understand and follow the trend of technological development in the 
industry. Most importantly, the firm did not content with the imported technology and 
equipments, instead it strived to carry out duplicative innovation in certain areas of 
process technology and product development. 
 Strong financial support. Since 1983 all SOEs needed to take bank loans for their 
working capital instead of entire reliance on government subsidies, and since 1985 the 
funding scheme of firms‟ fixed asset investment was changed from governmental 
subsidy to loans. These changes mean that firms were no longer entitled to „free lunch‟ 
when it comes to finance. However, during this period the state-owned banks were 
functioning as specialized banks (meaning the banks acted as investment channels for 
governments at different levels according to different industries, and their financial 
decisions were made administratively instead of commercially), as long as the state 
approved, CNEGC was always guaranteed with money for its technology introduction. 
 
4.2 Technological development constrained by shifting governance at Stage 2 
From 1990 CNEGC started to reduce its technology introduction drastically, and its 
technology strategy changed from introduction to imitation with a focus on the imitative 
development of large castings and forgings, together with independent R&D of products for 
metallurgical production lines. It indicates that CNEGC has been gradually upgrading from 
the stage of static capability to duplicative imitation capability. However, as mentioned in 
section 3.2.2, during this period the firm was not actively engaged in technological 
imitation and learning and its R&D investment decreased. Coupled with stagnated process 
improvement and equipment renewal, its technological development slowed down and its 
performance fluctuated frequently and worsened. Besides the adverse industrial 
environment, the firm‟s shifting CG&F failed to provide the appropriate support for its 
technological development. On the contrary, it curbed its path to innovation capability 
cultivation through imitative learning. 
The ownership type and structure of CNEGC did not experience any superficial change; 
however, the de facto mechanism has been shifting within the frame of „state-ownership‟. 
The state as an abstract legal entity could not execute its property rights, hence it delegated 
to various governmental departments and ministries at different levels. In such context, any 
organisational change in the governmental authority (removal or merger of departments, 
adjustment of administrative function, etc) could and have caused shifting ownership of the 
SOEs. This has also been the case for CNEGC. It belonged to the FMM at the time of 
establishment; and to the Provincial Bureau of Machinery between 1968-78; and then to 
„dual leadership by central and local governments, with FMM in charge of administration‟; 
and until 2000 its profit was collected by the city government while the Ministry of Finance 
overlooked its finance. The government agents, not knowing how long they would have to 
look after the firms, were hence discouraged to understand and engage in the development 
closely; therefore it has been impossible for them to understand the industry, the 
technology, or the market to develop appropriate technological strategy. 
As for management incentive scheme, CNEGC displayed three characteristics:  
 The firm had to meet both short-term profit targets and social obligations. Managers‟ 
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performance evaluation was based on the single criteria of short-term profitability. For 
instance, in 1989, the firm signed with the local city government a profit responsibility 
contract in which it was also committed to progressive profit submission until 1995. 
Annual assessment based on year-by-year profit had a direct effect on the short-
termism of CNEGC‟s management and its operation. On the other hand, the firm acted 
not only as a business but also a community – it ran its own schools, hospital, police 
station, etc. 
 Separated management selection and assessment. The quasi-official status of Chinese 
SOE managers means a long-standing separation of management selection and 
assessment (Xiao 1998; Xiao&Tang 2001). Since 1979 CNEGC‟s chief executives 
have been appointed by the administrative ministry; from 1999 its top managers were 
decided by the central government. However, performance assessment was done by the 
city government with which the firm has an operational contract. The Ministry of 
Finance took over the function when it started supervise the firm in 2000.  
 Lenient „relocation‟ to a similar position has been the major form of punishment for 
badly performance managers. Moreover, income roof and ceiling for managers allowed 
little space for financial reward and punishment. 
Financially, the firm also experienced hardship owing to poor sales and credit history. 
Moreover, from 1989 on the government attempted to remedy the overheated economy and 
tightened its fiscal and monetary system. CNEGC suffered from shortage of capital as well 
as cash flow problem in the time of need for expansion. Especially, in 1995 Commercial 
Bank Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated. It transformed the 
specialized banks before into commercial banks, which focuses on the safety, liquidity and 
benefit of their funds as financial corporations instead of the investment channels for 
government. It was the functional change of the banks that caused CNEGC was faced with 
worst financial situation when its performance was volatile. By 1995 it was even unable to 
pay its utility bills in full and the default further extended to wage payment. At certain stage 
it had to collect money from its employees (semi-compulsorily) to pay for the necessary 
equipments. 
Therefore, during Stage 2 which the competition became increasingly fierce, the shifting 
ownership caused lack of the incentive for managers to implement technological 
innovation. The short-term profit-oriented assessment criteria and the separation of 
management selection and assessment mechanism and non-economic penalties caused 
short-termist management and constrained the space for sustainable technology strategy. 
Technological imitation and process improvement were mainly subject to immediate 
manufacturing needs. Moreover, multiple social obligations dispersed its limited finance 
and other resources. Altogether, it is shifting corporate governance and poor finance that 
have played a crucial role in its stagnant technological development and poor performance. 
 
4.3 Innovation capabilities benefited from improvement in corporate governance 
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, CNEGC started to increase its R&D budget since 2001. In 
order to support the firm‟s ambition to become „the world-known base for complete-set 
equipment‟ and „the internationally-renowned base for castings and forgings‟, it 
implemented systematic strategic plans for technological development. From 2001 to 2007, 
its endeavour was reflected in: exploiting a series of new products protected by patent, 
equipment renewal and modification centering on the exploitation of new product in a large 
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scale, expansion of product line, replacement of foreign firms‟ leading roles to take charge 
of general technology in large-size complete-set equipments, pre-research of related 
cutting-edge technologies, etc. Its sales revenue and profit were also going up steadily. 
Apparently it is on a right track to transformation from technological imitation to 
indigenous innovation. During this process improved corporate governance and finance 
have played a significant and positive role. 
In the aspect of ownership structure and function as a film, CNEGC experienced three 
significant changes: (i) it converted around 597.59 million RMB of its debt from two state 
assessment management firms into equity shares and set up a joint venture with them. All 
of CNEGC‟s major businesses were taken over by the new firm in which CNEGC 
dominated the shares as well as senior management posts. The joint-venture had its own 
shareholders‟ meeting, board of directors and supervisory board, where „one-share-one-
vote‟ system was used. Boardroom seats were allocated according to shares, and the posts 
of CEO, COO were decided as per firm constitution. Through debt conversion CNEGC 
established a formal structure of governance. We can view this as an indirect improvement 
of its governance practice and one step towards ownership diversification. Moreover, this 
debt-to-equity swap greatly improved its capital structure. (ii) In 2002 CNEGC started to 
restructure the ownership structure of its six subsidiaries and transformed them into 
minority-state-shareholding enterprises. (iii) In 2003 it corporatized all of its non-profit 
operations. Such move relieved the firm from its social and political obligations. 
Since 2004, SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee of the 
State Council) replaced different ministries and acted as the only ownership agent of SOEs 
directly under central government. In January 2006 the revised Company Law introduced 
several meaningful changes. (i) In the revision, SASAC‟s role as legal agent was confirmed 
for the first time, which secured its long-term ownership and provided the necessary time to 
implement strategic policies and engage with the firms. (ii) The law empowered SASAC to 
appoint and remove Chairman of the board, the board of supervisors and CEO, which for 
the first time united the function of assessment and selection. (iii) SOEs now have the right 
to reward managers with firm shares, which can be traded during their service term. This 
means that stock option incentive is introduced to Chinese SOEs. It will hopefully motivate 
the top management to focus on the long-term development. 
Table 5 Portfolio of performance assessment in central enterprises by SASAC 
Financial Performance (70%) 
Managerial Performance 
(30%) 












Net asset earning 
ratio 
20 
Sales profit rate 10 Strategic 
management 
18 
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Debt risk 22 
asset/liability ratio 12 
Quick ratio 6 Basic 
management 
14 




Paid interest/debt 10 









Sales growth rate 12 
Sales profit growth 10 Influence in the 
industry 
8 
Growth rate of 
total asset 
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Meanwhile, performance assessment and reward/penalty system in SOEs has undergone 
significant changes – from singular standard (profit) to a portfolio of criteria; from 
assessment of operational results to the combined evaluation of results as well as process; 
from separated evaluation and reward to performance-based incentive scheme; and from 
annual profit evaluation to the inclusion of general performance in service term (3 years). 
These changes provided managers incentive to seek development through enhancement of 
technological capability. The year 2003 saw the implementation of two important statutes 
for SOE performance evaluation which applies to its Chair (and vice Chair) of Board, 
directors, CEO, COO and CFO. Senior managers are evaluated on the basis of annual as 
well as service term performance. Also, as Table 5 shows, „technical input ratio‟ has 
become one of the financial criteria. Meanwhile, „Strategic management‟ and 
„Development and innovation‟ are assessed for managerial performance. Therefore, the 
desire to encourage managers to develop technological capability is reflected in the 
portfolio.  
As argued above, adequate finance is crucial for large-scale indigenous innovation and 
technology transformation. In order to support its technological innovation, CNEGC tried 
hard to improve it financing capacity and expand its funding channels. Its endeavors are 
reflected in three aspects: (i) CNEGC utilized the policy to develop the west and acquired 
funding from central and local government investment projects. (ii) It expanded its source 
of funding from 5 state banks to 13, including joint-stock banks since 2004; the forms of 
funding were also changed from total reliance on loans to bill finance, factoring, letter of 
guarantee, letter of credit, etc. (iii) With the increase of sales and profit, its internal 
financing capacity also improved. 
 
4.4 CEO plays a key role in innovation capability development 
Last but not least, CEO‟s global vision and aspiration have been key in developing its 
innovation capability in CNEGC. 
The right guy was picked and given the time needed to implement appropriate strategy. In 
November 2001, Mr Shi Ke, a rising star from within the firm was promoted to CEO. 
Before that, Shi had worked in CNEGC for more than 20 years and acted as vice general 
manager for 10 years. As a firm insider with both industrial and organizational expertise, 
Shi knows very well what he needs to do and where CNEGC should go. Moreover, with the 
improved corporate governance in SOEs he was given time to do it. Soon CNEGC set a 
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new agenda to develop new products: “the firm‟s top priority is development, and the key 
to development is to develop new products that are technological advantageous and 
commercially successful.” (Shi, 2001).  
Shi next developed and implemented mid- and long-term strategic plans of CNEGC. 
Accordingly, the firm started to pay more attention to integration of internal and external 
resources for nurturing technological capability. Through developing complete product 
lines and taking charge of general technology in large-size complete-set equipments 
(instead of relying on foreign multinationals) CNEGC cultivated firm-specific and 
sustainable competitive capabilities. 7 years on, although it is too soon to claim victory, we 
can still see significant improvement in both product and commercial terms as shown 
section 3. 
Shi realised the urgent need to progress from duplicative imitation to indigenous 
innovation, from low-end product to high-technology mix, and from joint (dependent) 
design/production to self-reliant innovation. He pointed out that technological capability is 
not like ordinary commodity which can be purchased physically. It has to be developed 
from within and accumulated from hands-on experiences. Based on such vision, on the one 
hand CNEGC engaged in active learning and absorption of introduced foreign technology 
and consolidated its leading position in the generic product market. Meanwhile, it took the 
challenges to enter new technology field, such as equipments for clean energy projects and 
large-scale petrochemical industry. Moreover, through overseas organisational mergers and 
acquisitions and strategic alliances, it orchestrated and channelled external resources into 
the firm to enhance its technological competitiveness. By setting up an international-
networked R&D centre, it aimed to realise highly indigenous innovation capability in heavy 
machinery industry. 
Shi also acted on improving institutional environment for the development of innovation 
capability. He initiated and supervised the improvement of corporate governance in 
CNEGC and engaged in expanding financial channels and avoiding the financial risks. Just 
as discussed in the previous section, all of these efforts paid off, not only technologically, 
but also financially.  
 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
 
This paper set out to explore the efficient evolutionary path of technological capabilities in 
China‟s SOEs and to examine the role of institutional factors, particularly corporate 
governance (in the broadest sense) in technological development. In order to do that we 
depicted the three stages of technological capabilities in CNEGC in the past 30 years, and 
showed the connection between technological capabilities and firm‟s commercial 
performance in each stage. It also gave two examples to show the efficient path that 
CNEGC deployed to build innovation capabilities from technological dependent 
introduction and duplicate imitation. Furthermore, this paper examined the 30 years‟ 
changes of CG&F in China‟s SOEs to explain how CG&F affected technological 
development, especially the development of innovation capabilities. The conclusions are: 
(i) There is strong correlation between technological capability and commercial 
performance in CNEGC. At the first stage, it took advantage of the dominant opportunity of 
opening up and acquired some manufacturing capability through technology introduction, 
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and hence improved its sales. Thanks to such manufacturing capability, at stage 2 CNEGC‟s 
sales remained stable through collaborate manufacturing with foreign firms. However due 
to stagnant capability development it constantly suffered loss. At stage 3, it focused on the 
development of new products and innovation capabilities. Meanwhile, it paid more 
attention to equipment modification and renewal to further enhance it manufacturing 
capabilities. With these efforts, CNEGC has acquired sustainable performance record. 
(ii) The two examples in CNEGC show that, „Introduction-imitation-innovation‟ can be a 
successful pattern for „latecomers‟-China‟s SOEs to improve their technological 
capabilities. More specifically, they can develop dynamic innovation capabilities through 
efficient technological learning and sustainable right R&D. 
(iii) Till 2001, the corporate governance and institutional arrangement of SOEs‟ did not 
stimulate technological development. Contrarily, due to shifting governance agenda, flaws 
in management selection and assessment, soft „human resource constraint‟, and lack of 
finance, SOEs were not actively engaged by their shareholders, nor do the managers have 
the incentive and time to develop technological capability. Since 2001, along with the 
improved assessment criteria and management selection, especially after the revision of 
Company Law in 2006, the corporate governance of SOEs became more systematic and 
efficient. It gave SOE‟s managers the incentive and longer-term horizon to formulate 
appropriate technology strategy. It is likely that the latest progress in dynamic technological 
development in some SOEs can be explained by these changes. 
(iv) CEO‟s global vision and aspiration can play a decisive role in technological 
development, especially in guiding the firms out of the vicious cycle of dependent 
introduction and static capability growth. This role however, has to be conditioned by the 
situation of SOE corporate governance in China. 
The policy implications are clear-cut. With China‟s WTO membership and commitment to 
fair-play, government protection through monopoly is no longer viable. Competitive 
advantage has to be acquired through development of dynamic technological capabilities. 
Policy makers should think and work about how to utilize corporate governance mechanism 
to address the challenges of latecomers‟ technological change – understand the firms, 
encourage shareholders‟ engagement, measure and reward (sustainable) progress, and last 
but not least, choose the right person and make them think long. 
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